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NATURAL MEANINGS AND CULTURAL VALUES 
 
In many cases, rivers, mountains, forests and other so-called natural entities have value for 
us because they contribute to our well-being. According to the standard model of such 
value, they have instrumental or ‘service’ value for us on account of their causal powers. 
That model tends, however, to come up short when applied to cases when nature 
contributes to our well-being by virtue of the religious, political, historical, personal or 
mythic meanings it bears. To make sense of such cases, a new model of nature’s value is 
needed, one that registers the fact that nature can have constitutive value for us on account 
of the role it plays in certain meaningful wholes, such as a person’s sense of who she is. This 
paper presents such a model.* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1972, the Navajo activist Katherine Smith told Senate investigators that she would never quit her 
home on Big Mountain. I will ‘never leave the land, this sacred place’, she said. ‘The land is part of 
me and I will one day be part of the land… All that has meaning is here.’1  
In the following, I argue that environmental thinkers have typically failed to understand 
what sort of value nature has for us in cases such as this – cases, that is, in which people value 
natural entities on account of the meanings they embody. 
The paper is structured as follows. I begin by noting the common assumption that if some 
natural entity has value on account of the contributions it makes to human well-being, then it must 
be of instrumental value to certain humans on account of its causal relations to them. I argue that 
that assumption is false. In many cases, I propose, natural entities have value, not because they are 
means to certain ends, but because they are parts of certain meaningful wholes. Hence the standard 
causal-instrumentalist model of nature’s value for us must, I suggest, be augmented by a semiotic-
constitutive one. In the final three sections, I consider the latter model’s implications for debates 
                                                     
* I owe special thanks to Don Maier, Chris Diehm, Tom Greaves, David E. Cooper and two of the 
Journal’s anonymous referees for the helpful comments they provided on drafts of this paper. I am 
also very grateful for the feedback I received when I presented my views on natural meanings and 
cultural values at the University of Edinburgh, the IDEA Centre at the University of Leeds, the Bath 
Spa Centre for Research in the Environmental Humanities, the 14th Annual Meeting of the ISEE and 
the 22nd Annual Meeting of the IAEP. 
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about (i) concepts of naturalness, (ii) environmental rights and (iii) the intrinsic value of natural 
entities. 
 
2. Instrumentality and causation 
 
Many natural entities have value because they contribute to human well-being. Whether or not they 
have value for other reasons too, they have value for us in this sense.2 It is often assumed that if 
some natural entity has this sort of value then it must be of instrumental value to certain humans – 
of value, that is, as a means to some end that is of value to them. 
As Mark Greene and several other writers have noted, instrumentality involves causation:  
 
To have instrumental value is to make a causal contribution to bringing about a valuable 
state of affairs. The notion of a causal contribution is to be understood broadly. Both 
proximate causes and causally relevant background conditions can ground instrumental 
value.3 
 
Accordingly, in considering nature’s value for us, its value as a contributer to human well-being, 
people tend to think in terms of instrumentality and causal relations. They tend to assume that if 
some natural entity has value for certain humans then it must be of instrumental value to those 
humans on account of its causal relations to them. Indeed, this is typically assumed both by those 
who see natural entities as resources-to-be-plundered and by those who see them as providers of 
valuable ecosystem services.4 It doesn’t matter whether Gretchen sees the wood as nothing more 
than potential timber or as a provider of certain ecosystem services; either way, she sees it as being 
of instrumental value to certain human beings on account of its causal relations to them.  
Let me summarise these points by saying that in considering nature’s value for us, 
environmental ethicists, ecological economists and other environmental thinkers tend to adopt a 
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causal-instrumentalist (C-I) model. Now that model is not without merit. In fact it provides a good 
account of many cases in which natural entities are valuable for us humans. When, for instance, a 
tree supplies Aileen with shade from the fierce midday sun, then it is of instrumental value to Aileen 
on account of its causal relations to her. More generally, when nature provides us with supporting, 
provisioning or regulating services, the C-I model gives a good account of the value the relevant 
service-providers have for us. Conversely, it provides a good account of many of those cases when 
natural entities have disvalue for us because they detract from our well-being. 
In other cases, however, the C-I model comes up short. The case mentioned in the 
introduction, that of the late Katherine Smith, is one. Here are very brief sketches of two more: 
 
Saami reindeer herding: Reindeer are of instrumental value to the Saami people of Northern 
Scandinavia because they provide them with meat, hides and other products. But they are 
also of cultural value to them. Though only about ten-percent of Saami people continue to 
herd reindeer, the practice ‘remains at the heart of their culture and is central to their 
celebrations and traditions’.5 As the anthropologist Robert Paine observes, the Saami are not 
all agreed on who exactly they see themselves as being; even so, many of them continue to 
see themselves as reindeer herders. In this manner, reindeer make an important 
contribution to their ‘sense of self’.6 
 
Indigenous Australian spirituality: The stories of indigenous Australians tell of a time when 
creator beings, such as the Rainbow Serpent, moved through the land, moulding its features. 
The journeys of those beings are thought to have been preserved as ‘songlines’ or ‘dreaming 
tracks’ criss-crossing the country. Furthermore, the beings themselves are, in many cases, 
thought to persist in the natural forms into which they transformed at the end of their 
journeys. A goanna-shaped headland might be seen as a physical manifestation of the 
creator being Dirawong; a rainbow shimmering in the mist at the foot of a waterfall might be 
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taken to be a manifestation of the Rainbow Serpent. Accordingly, the spiritual beliefs and 
practices of particular indigenous tribes are rooted in particular landscapes. For them, the 
land is ‘the core of all spirituality’.7 
 
In many respects, these cases are unlike one another. Even so, each seems to involve some natural x 
being of value to certain people because it contributes, by virtue of the meanings it embodies, to 
their well-being. For example, Katherine Smith’s well-being seemed partly to depend on her 
continuing to live on Big Mountain – the place that was, as she said, ‘part’ of her. Likewise, the well-
being of the Saami seems partly to depend on their retaining a sense of their own identity as 
reindeer-herders.8 Similarly, the well-being of many indigenous Australians appears partly to derive 
from their continuing to find certain spiritual meanings in the land they inhabit (or once inhabited). 
One could, I admit, try to express the values highlighted in these cases in terms of 
instrumentality and causation. For example, one could adopt the instrumentalist idiom of the 
ecosystem services approach and say that the three cases illustrate cultural ecosystem services that 
nature provides. And, moreover, one could try to conceive of those instances of service-provision in 
causal terms. Certainly, some of those who adopt the ecosystem services approach seem to think 
that when nature provides us with cultural ecosystem services, it does so by causing certain mental 
states, such as ‘aesthetic experiences’ or ‘moral satisfaction’, to arise in us.9 Similarly, one could 
suppose that reindeer benefit the Saami by causing them to experience a sense of identity, for 
instance, or that certain landscapes benefit indigenous Australians by causing them to experience 
spiritual solace or inspiration. 
References to instrumentality and causation fail, however, to capture the intimacy of the 
nature-human relations in such cases. As many writers have noted, one problem with 
instrumentality, for its part, is that it implies substitutability.10 It’s possible, I guess, that x could be of 
merely instrumental value as a means to achieving some end, y, yet be the only possible means by 
which y might be achieved. But the suggestion seems to overstretch the meaning of 
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‘instrumentality’. For claims to the effect that something is a means to some end imply that the end 
in question could, if only in principle, be brought about by some other means.  
In none of the cases we have considered do any such substitutions seem possible. The 
shotgun-wielding, fence-wrecking Katherine Smith would not have happily moved to any other 
place, even one with greener grass and better amenities. For her, no other place would do. The 
Saami would not, I predict, count that nothing had been lost were they forced to swap reindeer 
herding for sheep-farming, even if the latter proved more lucrative. Likewise, one could not 
adequately compensate indigenous Australians for their eviction from their ancestral lands by 
moving them to other places that supply equivalent cultural ecosystem services. For them, as for 
Smith and the Saami, there could be no alternative service providers. Their relations with nature are 
closer than talk of service-provision, or any other form of instrumental relation, would suggest. 
References to causation are also inadequate. As John Heil observes, causal relations are 
typically conceived of as external relations – relations, that is, in which ‘you could have the relata, 
just as they are, without their standing in the relation.’11 Yet none of the cases we have considered 
can adequately be framed in such terms. Take the case of the Saami. It is not as if there are two 
distinct entities, the Saami on the one hand and the reindeer on the other, and an external relation 
tying them together. No, one cannot describe who the Saami as a people are without referring to 
the fact that they are reindeer herders.12 Even if all the reindeer were to die out, the Saami would, I 
suspect, continue to regard themselves in the light of their dealings with those animals. Insofar as 
they retained a sense of their own cultural identity, they would see themselves as the people who 
once herded reindeer. 
Though it would take much more argument to prove the point, it seems that the C-I model 
cannot provide an adequate account of any of the three cases sketched above. To account for the 
cultural value of Big Mountain for Katherine Smith, or of reindeer for the Saami, or of certain natural 
landscapes for indigenous Australians – to provide a complete and adequate account of those 
values, one cannot rely solely on appeals to instrumentality and causation. 
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This is a troubling result. For it suggests that some people find a sort of value in nature which 
cannot adequately be expressed in the instrumentalist language favoured by those who adopt the 
currently-popular ecosystem services approach. So if such people are required by researchers to 
adopt such language, they will find it hard to express some of the value they find in nature, which, in 
turn, may well lead the researchers to underestimate that value. This raises an issue of procedural 
justice. Thomas Sikor et al. maintain that the ecosystem services framework ‘closes down 
possibilities for justice’ since it tends to ‘marginalise people by denying the recognition of their… 
conceptions of value’.13 Though more work would be needed to prove the point, it seems likely that 
a one-sided focus on the C-I model could also exacerbate this marginalisation. 
 
3. Constitution and meaning 
 
The C-I model is based on causal relations; however, not all relations are causal. For example, the 
relation between the words ‘fierce’ and ‘ferocious’ – namely, synonymy – is not a causal relation. It 
is a semantic relation – a relation of meaning. That is to say, it is a relation that obtains between 
‘fierce’ and ‘ferocious’ by virtue of the respective meanings of those words. 
 What sorts of things can have meaning? Some will be sceptical of the view that anything has 
meaning, perhaps because they have fallen into a state of despair and/or because they have come to 
believe that there is something metaphysically dubious about the very notion of a meaning. Others 
will maintain that although some things have meaning, natural entities, such as marjoram, mandrills 
and mangroves, cannot. This would be the view taken by those writers for whom meanings can, 
strictly speaking, be borne only by linguistic items (such as words), uses of them (such as assertions) 
and users of them (such as speakers).14 Such people will concede, of course, that meanings are 
conventionally attributed to non-linguistic items; however, they will propose that any statement 
that such an item has meaning could be perfectly translated into terms that do not refer to meaning 
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at all. For example, they may translate the statement ‘Those clouds mean rain’ into something like 
‘Those clouds cause rain’.15 
 There is not enough space, here, to refute either of those views. In what follows, I will 
merely assume that (a) some things do in fact have meaning and (b) not all of them are linguistic 
items, uses of them or users of them. 
 So, again, what sorts of things can have meaning? It does not stretch the meaning of 
‘meaning’ to say that a smile, a bow or the eating of a communion wafer have meaning. (And, to 
switch languages, it certainly doesn’t stretch the meaning of sens to say that such things have sens.) 
But it is not just human acts, practices and institutions that can have meaning. Material things can 
have them too. This is not simply to say that some such things embody the intentions of their 
makers, for artefacts can acquire meanings that do not reflect those intentions – as when, for 
instance, a particular mass-produced pen acquires historical meaning because it was used to sign 
some important political treaty. Nor is it to say that anything may have meaning conferred upon it, 
as when children agree that a certain ditch is a moat, a certain hill a fort and a certain stick a flag. 
Rather, it is to say that we find ourselves in a world in which things are – as phenomenologists say - 
always already meaningful.  
This includes natural things.16 When Aldo Leopold saw the crane as ‘the symbol of our 
untameable past’ he saw it – that is, the crane, and not simply the word ‘crane’ - as having a certain 
meaning.17 To see the bamboo’s hollow core as a metaphor for the essenceless nature of all things is 
to find a certain religious and philosophical meaning in the plant.18 To find in buddleia, ‘the butterfly 
bush’, a wonderfully non-indigenous symbol of wildness for post-Brexit Britain is to find a certain 
meaning in the plant.19 To see God’s ontological simplicity and lofty indifference symbolised by the 
great sweeping dunes of a desert is to find a certain cluster of meanings in that landscape. I make no 
attempt, here, to catalogue the different sorts of meanings nature can have.20 Instead, I merely note 
that in this sense of ‘meaning’, all manner of natural things, organisms, processes and events, from 
hedgerows to the changing of the seasons, can be said to have meaning.21 
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Meaning depends on context. A word has whatever meaning it has in the context of the 
sentence in which it occurs; a musical phrase acquires its meaning from its place in a particular 
musical piece; a particular sacred grove owes its meaning to some wider constellation of religious 
beliefs and practices – and so forth.22 Take the consumption of a communion wafer. That act has 
meaning only in the context of the Christian ritual of the Eucharist. To be sure, an extraterrestrial 
observer might infer that the act had some sort of religious meaning; yet if she had no 
understanding of the concept of religion, she wouldn’t even be able to infer that. In her (giant, UV-
sensitive) eyes, the act might well be entirely incomprehensible. The relation, in this as in all such 
cases, is not of a means-end sort: it is a part-whole relation. The word has whatever meaning it has 
as part of the sentence, the act has whatever meaning it has as part of the ritual – and so forth.  
In some of those cases in which some natural x has meaning, x will have value for us (in the 
special sense specified above) on account of the meaning it bears.23 And in these cases the value will 
track the meaning. That is to say, when x has value for us on account of its meaning, and that 
meaning depends on some context, y, then x’s value for us will depend on y. For example, suppose 
that a certain act has meaning in the context of a certain religious ritual. If that act has value for us 
on account of this meaning, then it will have value as part of the ritual. More generally, when 
something has value for us on account of its meaning, it is of value because it is part of, rather than 
merely a means to, something that is of value for us. Though it may well have value for other 
reasons too, it is of constitutive value for us on account of its meanings.24 
One important difference between the concept of constitution and that of instrumentality is 
as follows. As we saw above, claims that x is in principle the only means to some end sound odd. It is 
hard to fathom the idea that something has value as a necessary or essential means to some end. By 
contrast, there is nothing at all strange about the notion that something might be an essential part 
of some whole, as apples are essential to apple pie, for instance, or the Mona Lisa’s smile is essential 
to the Mona Lisa. That is not to say that if x is of constitutive value in relation to some whole, y, x 
must be an essential part of y. But it might be. And, indeed, each of the cases considered above 
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seems to involve some natural x having constitutive value as an essential – that is, non-substitutable 
- part of some meaningful whole. 
Take the example of the Saami people. As we saw, reindeer provide a sort of ‘master 
symbol’ in their culture.25 Amongst other things, they have value for the Saami because various 
practices involving reindeer, including their capture, herding, castrating, branding and slaughter, 
contribute to the Saami’s sense of who, as a people, they are.26 In fact reindeer seem to be an 
essential part of the Saami people’s sense of who they are. As the Saami themselves put it, their 
culture ‘has traditionally been and remains essentially based on reindeer husbandry.’27 And even if 
reindeer are not, strictly speaking, an essential part of the Saami people’s sense of who they are, 
they seem to play such an important role in it that it would be bad for the Saami were they to lose 
their connection with the animals.28 
Much the same can be said of Big Mountain’s value to Katherine Smith or of the spiritual 
value of the land for indigenous Australians. In such cases, nature has value on account of the fact 
that it is, by virtue of the meanings it embodies, part of some meaningful whole. To comprehend 
such cases, one cannot rely on a causal-instrumentalist model of nature’s value for us. One must 
appeal to a semiotic-constitutive model, too. 
 
4. Clarifications 
 
Before moving on, let me clarify what I am not claiming. First, I do not mean to suggest that if some 
natural entity has constitutive value for certain humans then it must be of value all things 
considered. Consider the ‘holy rats’ of the Karni Mata Temple in India, for instance. They seem to 
have some measure of constitutive value to priests and worshippers on account of the religious 
meanings they bear. Nonetheless, if the animals turn out to be carrying bubonic plague, they are 
unlikely to have value all things considered. Second, I do not mean to suggest that if something is 
taken to have constitutive value, it must really have that value, nor that if a thing is of constitutive 
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value to some person, that person must take it to have that value. Some entity, x, may be of 
constitutive value to some person, A, even if A regards x as being of value in itself, independently of 
any relation to her own well-being.29 Indeed, x may be of value to A even if she regards it as having 
disvalue. (For instance, wild nature might play an important positive role in the form of life of a 
rugged frontiers-person, even though she regards it as an enemy to be uprooted and replaced with 
farmland.) 
So I have not claimed that every natural entity that has constitutive value has value all things 
considered, nor that every entity that has constitutive value is taken to have that value. All I have 
suggested is that some natural entities have value for us on account of the fact that they are parts of 
certain meaningful wholes. 
 
5. A brief note on naturalness 
 
The preceding arguments might also be used to support the conclusion that certain non-natural 
entities have this kind of value. The Statue of Liberty, for instance, has constitutive value for many 
New Yorkers just as Uluru (‘Ayer’s Rock’) has constitutive value for some indigenous Australians. 
What is more, even when a certain natural entity has constitutive value, it is a further question 
whether it has such value precisely because it is (or is taken to be) natural. Consider reindeer. Even if 
they qualify as being in some sense natural, it is a further question whether they are of value to the 
Saami because they are natural in that sense, or because they are regarded as such. 
Do any entities have constitutive value precisely because they are (or are taken to be) 
natural? It depends what one means by ‘natural’. In the present context, that word may be taken to 
mean something like largely unshaped by human intentions. So, do entities that are natural in this 
sense of ‘natural’ have constitutive value for us precisely because they are natural? Some will reject 
the question as misguided. Steven Vogel, for instance, argues that to claim that any part of the world 
is natural in this sense is both apt to generate confusion and indicative of an erroneous dualistic 
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metaphysics.30 Nonetheless, whether or not this sort of nature-scepticism is justified, the fact 
remains that many people in modern Western societies do mark out some parts of the world as 
being largely unshaped by human intentions. And for such people, those entities they regard as 
natural in this sense may be of constitutive value precisely because they seem to be natural. For 
example, apparently natural entities may have constitutive value for those who lament the fact that 
such entities are being either destroyed or, through anthropogenic influences, rendered less natural, 
and for whom, therefore, ‘natural’ connotes fragile, precious, etc. They may also be of constitutive 
value to green consumers, for whom ‘natural’ implies wholesome, ethically produced, etc. In the 
lives of such people, certain entities may play a central and positive role precisely because they are 
taken to be natural. 
 
6. Environmental rights 
 
In many cases, natural entities – and, as we just saw, a great many other entities too - are of value 
because of the roles they play in certain meaningful wholes. Such wholes can take various forms. 
They can, for instance, take the form of cultures (such as that of the Saami), individual lives (such as 
that of Katherine Smith) or spiritual traditions (such as the spiritual tradition of a particular group of 
indigenous Australians).  
Suppose that some entity plays an important role in some meaningful whole. It is a further 
question whether the entity has constitutive value, for it acquires constitutive value by virtue of its 
contribution to the whole only if the whole is itself valuable. 
 To clarify this idea, it may help to consider an extreme case:  
 
Cornflowers: Between 1934 and 1938, the Nazi party was banned in Austria. During this 
period, Austrian Nazis wore blue cornflowers as secret badges.  
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Suppose that blue cornflowers are an essential part of a certain meaningful whole - the Nazi form of 
life. It is a further question whether they acquire constitutive value as a result. And the answer to 
that further question is clear: the Nazi form of life is not itself valuable; so the cornflowers do not 
acquire value by contributing to it. 
Now consider a second (fictitious) example: 
 
The benevolent volcano: Manaka is a police officer in Tokyo. Following an injury to the head, 
she comes to believe that Mount Fuji is a benevolent deity that watches over her and 
ensures that she doesn’t come to harm. 
 
Though Mount Fuji plays an important role in Manaka’s life, it is a further question whether it 
acquires constitutive value as a result. And, again, the answer to that question would seem to be 
‘no’. Manaka’s life might not be morally dubious; however, since it is marked by delusion, it does not 
seem to qualify as a valuable whole. 
 The general principle that is emerging is as follows. To judge whether any particular entity 
has constitutive value, one must appraise the meaningful whole to which it contributes. If that whole 
does not qualify as valuable – because it is morally dubious, for instance, or because it is marked by 
certain delusions – then the entity does not acquire constitutive value by contributing to it. 
 A third example: 
 
Whale hunting: The annual hunting of long-finned pilot whales plays a key role in the culture 
of the people of the Faroe Islands in the North Atlantic.  
 
This presents a rather harder case. If the Faroese form of life is morally dubious, then the whales do 
not acquire constitutive value by virtue of the role they play in it. If, by contrast, that form of life 
qualifies as valuable – or valuable enough - then the whales have constitutive value, which is, 
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amongst other things, to say that the value of the creatures is enhanced by the fact that they play an 
important role in the Faroese form of life. That suggestion will strike some as wrong. However, it is 
worth noting that even if the whales have constitutive value for this reason, they have other sorts of 
value, too – and acknowledging the normative ‘pull’ generated by these other values may 
undermine one’s commitment to the practice of whale-hunting. So, for example, the whales may 
have constitutive value on account of the roles they play in the Faroese form of life and value by 
virtue of the fact that they are sentient beings; and the latter may outweigh the former. In such 
cases, then, the constitutive value of the entity generates a normative pull that is in tension with the 
‘pulls’ generated by some of the entity’s other values. Yet not all such conflicts are irresolvable. 
Sticking with the whale-hunting case, one could hold that the whales gain some measure of 
constitutive value on account of the roles they play in Faroese culture and yet consistently condemn 
the practice of hunting them. Perhaps the Faroese form of life could evolve in such a way that 
whales, though not the hunting of them, remained central to it.  
 I do not want to insist that my reading of the whale-hunting case is correct. I used the 
example merely in order to convey the general point spelt out above. That point bears upon more 
than just matters of value; it connects with concepts of moral rights, too. For if a certain natural 
entity is found to be sufficiently important to a certain form of life, and if, moreover, that form of life 
is judged to be sufficiently valuable, then the best way to express the entity’s constitutive value may 
be by means of appeal to the concept of a right to cultural identity.31 Return, one last time, to the 
example of the Saami. If reindeer really are very important to the Saami’s form of life, and if that 
meaningful whole is indeed valuable, then there may be grounds to argue that reindeer ought to be 
protected under the auspices of the Saami’s moral or legal right to their own cultural identity. In the 
legal sphere, such an argument could take its cue from existing legislation designed to protect 
cultural identity, such as Article 5 of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of 
Cultural Heritage for Society or Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.32 
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7. Beyond nature’s value for us 
 
We have been considering nature’s value for us – the value it has on account of the contributions it 
makes to human well-being. Yet readers towards the dark green pole of the environmental spectrum 
may well dismiss this focus on nature’s value for us as unacceptably anthropocentric. 
An initial response to this charge would be to point out that the semiotic-constitutive model 
calls into question the following assumption: 
 
(A) nature’s value must ultimately have its source either in us humans or in nature.  
 
Consider those cases when some natural entity has constitutive value because it has helped to 
shape, not just who a certain people take themselves to be, but who they actually are. In such cases, 
no clear line can be drawn between the people and the natural world they inhabit, and (A) therefore 
becomes difficult to uphold. 
Still, the objection can be pushed. ‘Is it not the case,’ the critic will ask, ‘that nature can have 
value which isn’t value for us?’ Nature can indeed have this sort of value. For instance, some natural 
entities have value because they contribute to the well-being of nonhuman beings. I am not sure 
whether any such entities have constitutive value to any nonhuman beings on account of the 
meanings they have for them. But some certainly do have instrumental value for them, as berries are 
of value to bears or aspen twigs to beavers. Moreover, perhaps some natural entities are of value 
not because they contribute to anyone’s – or anything’s – well-being, but for other reasons. And, in 
fact, some natural entities might matter to us in a positive way which is not well-expressed by saying 
that they have value.33 Consider, again, a case where x is essential, not just to A’s sense of her own 
identity, but to A’s identity. Is x of value to A? The claim that it is might be thought to raise a non-
identity problem; for what sense (one might wonder) could there be in saying that x is of value to A, 
if A would not be A were it not for her relation to x? To take another example, consider the place 
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described in Edward Abbey’s Desert Solitaire. Abbey doesn’t seem to think that the sun-bleached 
landscape of Arches National Park has any instrumental value: it is, he writes, ‘totally useless, quite 
unprofitable.’34 Nor, however, does he appear to think that it has any value on account of the 
meanings it embodies. In his view, the desert ‘means nothing. It is as it is and has no need for 
meaning.’35 Nonetheless, the place obviously matters to Abbey. It matters, I suggest, in a way that is 
not well captured by talk of value. References to sanctity seem more apt. 
I will not explore these issues here. But I hope I have done enough to show that we will need 
to use a broad palette of concepts, if we are to comprehend all the ways that nature matters to us. 
We will certainly need to look beyond appeals to instrumentality and causation. Amongst other 
things, we will need to consider part-whole relations and relations of meaning. 
 
                                                     
1 Quoted in Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Native North American Resistance to Genocide, 
Ecocide and Colonization (San Francisco: City Lights, 2002), p. 151. 
2 I address the topic of naturalness in Section 5. For now, I merely state that I use the term ‘natural’ 
as a rough and ready way of indicating the sorts of entities (events and processes included) that 
environmentalists characteristically wish to protect. So, setting aside any tricky cases, wolverines, 
old-growth forests and the annual migration of monarch butterflies are ‘in’, while i-Pads, Cinnabon 
stores and the Super Bowl are ‘out’. 
3 ‘On the Origin of Species Notions and their Ethical Limitations’, in T. L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 577-
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